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FIRST AMENDMENT LAW—FREE SPEECH AND
HIGHER EDUCATION: CAN PUBLIC COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES USE “SAFE SPACE” POLICIES TO RESTRICT
SPEECH ON CAMPUSES?
John L. Magistro, IV*
The freedom to speak openly, without fear of reprisal, is one of the
great defining characteristics of our country. Nowhere is this freedom
more crucial than the arena of higher education. Whether seeking a
degree in the arts or sciences, philosophy or physics, students who
venture off to college share one thing in common—their thirst for
knowledge. However, this pursuit of knowledge can, and does, cause
students to confront unfamiliar, uncomfortable, and sometimes
unpleasant material. In college classrooms, cafeterias, and quads
across the country, students have begun seeking shelter from thoughts
and ideas that might make them uncomfortable. Lately, these shelters
have been taking the form of “safe spaces”—areas where students can
come together and be protected from hearing viewpoints or opinions
that might upset them. However, when “safe spaces” limit what can
be spoken or expressed in a public arena, they have the potential to
infringe upon students’ First Amendment right of free speech. This
Note argues that using “safe spaces” to limit, restrict, or punish what
students can say on public college and university campuses violates
the First Amendment.
“I want you to be offended every single day on campus. I want you to
be deeply aggrieved and offended and upset and then learn how to
speak back.”1

* Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2019. Sincere
thanks to all the faculty and staff who have fostered my growth as a student and future
practitioner. I would also like to express my appreciation for the friends and family who have
supported me throughout this entire experience–I could not have done this without you.
1. Flemming Rose, Safe Spaces on College Campuses Are Creating Intolerant Students,
HUFFPOST (Mar. 30, 2017, 9:54 AM) (quoting Van Jones, former advisor to former President
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INTRODUCTION
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”2
This language inarguably represents the founders’ belief that having free
and open discourse is critical in allowing our democracy to function.3
Indeed, “[t]he protection given speech . . . was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.”4 Significantly, “[t]he college
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of
ideas,’”5 and therefore prone to the clash of perspectives that accompanies
any discussion of opposing viewpoints.6 If speech is protected to allow
open, candid discourse—and college campuses are inherently the arenas
of such discourse—the logical conclusion would be that restricting speech
on public college and university campuses is not only unconstitutional,
but also detrimental to the prosperity and advancement of society as a
whole.7
And yet, students at public colleges and universities around the
country have been voicing criticisms about their institutions, claiming
“their schools should keep them from being ‘bombarded’ by discomfiting
or distressing viewpoints.”8 In fact, a very real trend is emerging among
Barack Obama), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/safe-spaces-college-intolerant_us_
58d957a6e4b02a2eaab66ccf [https://perma.cc/79N3-RD9Y] (“Ideological and other kinds of
diversity are important on college campuses and in a liberal democracy because they cultivate
tolerance . . . .”).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Thomas I. Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 737, 740 (1977) (footnote omitted). “The guarantee of the first amendment
was clearly intended to reach the extent described by Blackstone, namely as a prohibition of any
system of control over the process of printing, any advance censorship of publication, and the
like.” Id. at 737.
4. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
5. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
6. Natasha Josefowitz, Contentious Opposing Views: How to Co-Exist Peacefully in
Tough Times, HUFFPOST (Feb. 27, 2017, 7:42 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
contentious-opposing-views-how-to-co-exist-peacefully_us_58b4c715e4b02f3f81e44ba1
[https://perma.cc/9UQH-JC5Z] (“I have caught myself trying to persuade a friend about the
obvious wrongness of her ideas, and much to my dismay, instead of an intelligent discussion, it
turned into a disagreeable exchange of not exactly name-calling, but dismissing the other as
incomprehensibly and irremediably off.”).
7. See Rose, supra note 1 (“Ideological and other kinds of diversity are important on
college campuses and in a liberal democracy because they cultivate tolerance . . . .”).
8. Judith Shulevitz, In College and Hiding from Scary Ideas, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/opinion/sunday/judith-shulevitz-hiding-from-scary-
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college students: they are developing a perception that they “need to be
safe ideologically, [they] need to be safe emotionally, [and they] just need
to feel good all the time.”9 Thus began the push for public colleges and
universities to create “safe spaces” where students can retreat from
thoughts, topics, and ideas that make them uncomfortable.
But what is a “safe space?” Where do they come from, what do they
look like, and why have they become so popular? As a concept, “safe
space” originated either in the 1960s and 1970s when feminism and
female empowerment began to gain a strong following across the country,
or during the 1990s when gay and lesbian equality was brought to the
forefront of social consciousness.10 In this context, “safe spaces [were]
innocuous gatherings of like-minded people who agree[d] to refrain from
ridicule[ ] [or] criticism . . . so that everyone [could] relax enough to
explore the nuances of [sensitive subjects].”11
Others consider “safe spaces” to be “place[s] (as on a college campus)
intended to be free of bias, conflict, criticism, or potentially threatening
actions, ideas, or conversations.”12 Specifically, “[s]afety in this sense
does not refer to physical safety. Instead, [college] safe space refers to
protection from psychological or emotional harm.”13 One such “safe
space,” established as a refuge for students during a presentation by a
sexual assault survivor, was “equipped with cookies, coloring books,
bubbles, Play-Doh, calming music, pillows, blankets and a video of
frolicking puppies.”14 Undoubtedly, this “safe space” was established to
“help vulnerable students . . . and protect[] their health and safety from
any mental tolls,”15 while also allowing students to “take control over the
information they decide to receive and how to receive it.”16
ideas.html; see also KNIGHT FOUNDATION, FREE EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS: WHAT COLLEGE
STUDENTS THINK ABOUT FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES 12–13 (2018), https://kf-siteproduction.s3.amazonaws.com/publications/pdfs/000/000/248/original/Knight_Foundation_Fr
ee_Expression_on_Campus_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YB4-GL4X].
9. Rose, supra note 1.
10. Shulevitz, supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. Safe Space, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
safe%20space [https://perma.cc/ZV28-XEG4] [hereinafter Safe Space].
13. Lynn C. Holley & Sue Steiner, Safe Space: Student Perspectives on Classroom
Environment, 41 J. SOC. WORK EDUC. 49, 50 (2005).
14. Shulevitz, supra note 8.
15. Fuad Rafidi, Safe Spaces and First Amendment Rights: Do Safe Spaces Belong on
College Campuses?, JURIST (Dec. 1, 2016, 9:26 AM), http://www.jurist.org/dateline/2016/
12/Fuad-Rafidi-safe-college.php [https://perma.cc/G8UQ-SSZ8].
16. RaeAnn Pickett, Trigger Warnings and Safe Spaces Are Necessary, TIME (Aug. 31,
2016),
http://time.com/4471806/trigger-warnings-safe-spaces/
[https://perma.cc/DNY4YJEU].
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Therefore, safe spaces, as outlined above, serve the purpose of
filtering various thoughts, ideas, opinions, and experiences—effectively
restricting exposure to anything a student may find subjectively
uncomfortable, unpleasant, or even offensive. While this may seem like
a worthy, laudable goal for the nation’s public colleges and universities,
this Note argues that the protections afforded by safe spaces are not only
detrimental to students, but are unconstitutional restrictions of free
speech.17 Surely, as public colleges and universities attempt to keep
students safe from uncomfortable issues and viewpoints, “[students will]
be unprepared for the social and intellectual headwinds that will hit them”
after graduation.18 Furthermore, filtering the information available to
students, however well-intentioned, runs afoul of the very purpose of the
First Amendment.19
This Note argues that safe space policies are unconstitutional
restrictions of free speech under the First Amendment and should not be
implemented on public college and university campuses. Part I explores
the history of First Amendment litigation relating specifically to free
speech and focusing on the relationship between free speech jurisprudence
and the academic environment. Part II examines past and current attempts
at regulating speech at public colleges and universities. Finally, Part III
compares safe spaces to their regulatory predecessors and explains why
they are both unconstitutional restrictions of free speech and harmful to
students in a broader context.
I.

A HISTORY OF FIRST AMENDMENT LITIGATION

For over one hundred years after the ratification of the Constitution,
free speech and the First Amendment went unchallenged.20 Then, in 1919,
free speech faced its first true hurdle in the Supreme Court.21 Thereafter,
courts were tasked with determining whether different kinds of speech
17. See Rose, supra note 1; cf. Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Trouble with Teaching Rape Law,
NEW YORKER (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trouble-teachingrape-law [https://perma.cc/7VK8-L7M8].
18. Shulevitz, supra note 8.
19. See David L. Hudson Jr. & Lata Nott, Hate Speech & Campus Speech Codes,
FREEDOM F. INST. (Mar. 2017), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/hate-speech-campusspeech-codes/ [https://perma.cc/RP2S-MQ5X] (“[T]he suppression of speech, even where the
speech’s content appears to have little value and great costs, amounts to governmental thought
control.” (quoting UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1174 n.9 (E.D. Wis.
1991))).
20. See Emerson, supra note 3, at 739.
21. See generally Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48–51 (1919) (providing
defendants’ argument that free speech protections granted by the First Amendment allowed
them to promote and encourage draft-dodging).
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were truly protected under the First Amendment, whether the government
can regulate such speech, and to what extent it may be regulated.22 Due
to the importance of these answered questions, Part I of this Note will
focus on cases that have examined a governmental attempt to regulate
protected speech, establish a new category of unprotected speech, or
clarify an otherwise murky precedent. This Note will also remain focused
on issues of free speech and speech restriction that are relevant to the
discourse expected on public college and university campuses.
A. Milestones in the Evolution of Protected Speech
On several occasions, the Supreme Court was tasked with deciding
whether the government can place restrictions upon the freedom of speech
enjoyed by everyone in the country.23 Those instances will be used as a
point of comparison for the type of speech that safe space policies attempt
to curtail. Therefore, it is important to understand the history of free
speech litigation to better evaluate the current climate of potential speech
regulations.
1.

1919: Schenck v. United States

The Supreme Court presided over the case involving a man who was
allegedly responsible for obstructing the enlistment process of the United
States military.24 The issue before the Court was whether fliers printed
and distributed by Schenck were protected speech under the First
Amendment despite legislation that made encouragement of
insubordination illegal.25 Although normally Schenck would have been
within his rights to distribute the fliers,26 the Court took issue with the

22. See infra Sections I.A–I.B.
23. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (holding that speech
arguing a political opinion will be afforded First Amendment protection, even when that speech
is offensive); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (holding that speech “having even
the slightest redeeming social importance” is protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (listing certain “classes” of unprotected
speech, such as “fighting words”); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (questioning whether the nature and
circumstances of speech “create[s] a clear and present danger”); see also Porter v. Ascension
Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that “true threats” are unprotected
speech).
24. See generally Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48–50, 51 (alleging defendants violated the
Espionage Act by producing and distributing pamphlets instructing men to resist the draft by
“assert[ing] your opposition to the draft”).
25. Id. at 48–49.
26. Id. at 52 (“We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying
all that was said in the [flier] would have been within their constitutional rights.”).
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unique situation that existed at the time, noting that “the character of every
act depend[s] on the circumstances in which it is done.”27
In fact, at the outset of the opinion, the Court was very careful to
acknowledge that the allegations against Schenck arose while the United
States was at war with the Axis Powers, indicating that encouraging
insubordination during an active war effort rose above the traditional
expression of free speech.28 In fact, the Court later opined, “[w]hen a
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such
a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as
men fight.”29
The Court also noted that “[t]he most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic.”30 This indicates that circumstances significantly inferior
to war could still rise to a level where speech is no longer protected.31 To
underscore this point, the Court held that “[t]he question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
[such evils].”32
In establishing the “clear and present danger” standard, the Court
proclaimed for the first time that the First Amendment did not protect all
speech.33 In fact, not only did the Court determine that some speech may
never be protected, the Court also held that speech that might otherwise
be protected by the First Amendment could lose some or all of those
protections depending on the circumstances under which the speech
occurred.34 This standard, also known as the “circumstances and nature”
test, is one the Court has continued to use when determining issues of
protected speech.35
27. Id.
28. Id. at 49, 52.
29. Id. at 52.
30. Id.
31. See id. (“[Free speech protection] does not even protect a man from an injunction
against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.”).
32. Id.
33. Id. A query of LexisNexis and Westlaw returned no Supreme Court cases that
addressed the government’s ability to regulate or punish speech in any regard prior to deciding
Schenck.
34. See id. at 52 (holding that restrictions may be placed on speech during times of war).
35. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011) (emphasis added) (“In
considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate
all the circumstances of the speech, including what was said, where it was said, and how it was
said.”); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood that
the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”); Herndon v.
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2. 1942: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
Twenty-three years after Schenck, the Court took the seemingly
narrow exceptions of unprotected speech outlined above and broadly
expanded them.36 In Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness exclaimed that
someone on a public street was a “damned racketeer” and a “damned
Fascist.”37 The Court determined that “well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech” could be prohibited without violating the First
Amendment.38 These classes of speech included lewd, obscene, profane,
libelous, and insulting language, as well as “fighting words.”39
Specifically, “fighting words” are “those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”40
3. 1957: Roth v. United States
In 1957, the Court chose to address the constitutionality of federal
and state obscenity statutes, in particular, as they pertain to the
aforementioned classes of lewd and obscene speech.41 The Roth case
actually joined two causes of action: Roth, who was convicted of violating
federal law by distributing obscene material via mail, 42 and Alberts, who
was convicted of violating a California statue, which prohibited the
creation, distribution, or advertisement of obscene material.43
The Court analyzed the underlying purpose of having protected
speech, stating “[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to
the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of [the First
Amendment].”44 The Court then restated its language about “narrowly
limited classes” of speech—citing lewd and obscene speech specifically—
and opining that “such utterances are no essential part of any exposition
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 256 (1937) (“We recognized, however, that words may be spoken or
written for various purposes and that wilful [sic] and intentional interference with the described
operations of the government might be inferred from the time, place, and circumstances of the
act.”); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919) (emphasis added) (“If [obstruction] was
intended and if, in all the circumstances, [obstruction] would be its probable effect, [the speech]
would not be protected by reason of its being part of a general program and expressions of a
general and conscientious belief.”).
36. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
37. Id. at 569.
38. Id. at 571–72.
39. Id. at 572.
40. Id.
41. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479 (1957).
42. Id. at 480.
43. Id. at 481.
44. Id. at 484.
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of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.”45 To that end, the Court noted that the free
speech protections of the First Amendment are primarily concerned with
allowing and encouraging the discussion and exchange of “all matters of
public concern.”46
Truly, “[t]he fundamental freedom[] of
speech . . . [has] contributed greatly to the development and well-being of
our free society.”47
After applying this analysis to the claims of Roth and Alberts, the
Court concluded that lewd and obscene speech falls outside the
protections afforded by the First Amendment.48 In so doing, the Court
solidified that these classes of speech can be restricted through
governmental means, albeit for seemingly sincere reasons.49
4. 1969: Watts v. United States
Twelve years later, in 1969, another issue of free speech was
presented to the Court: the right to engage in political discourse.50 Watts
engaged in a political discussion during a public rally at the Washington
Monument in Washington, D.C.51 At this rally, and in response to a
remark about education, Watts stated “[t]hey always holler at us to get an
education. And now I have already received my draft classification . . . If
they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is
L.B.J.”52 As a result, Watts was convicted of a felony for “knowingly and
willfully threatening the President.”53
In its analysis, the Court stated that “[t]he language of the political
arena . . . is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact.”54 Indeed, “debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open [sic],
and . . . may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials.”55 Therefore, looking
at Watts’ statements in context, the Court concluded his speech was akin
45. Id. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
46. Id. at 488 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940)).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 492.
49. See id. at 488.
50. See generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (holding that political
discourse is afforded First Amendment protection).
51. Id. at 706.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 708 (citation omitted).
55. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
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to voicing his own political opinion.56 By holding that—despite being
crude and offensive—Watts voiced his opposition to the current political
climate, the Court effectively ruled that speech voicing or conveying a
political opinion is crucial enough to be afforded First Amendment
protection, even though such speech can be particularly crass.57
5.

1989: Ward v. Rock Against Racism

Perhaps the largest provision for governmental regulation of speech
came in 1989: content neutral restrictions. Rock Against Racism (RAR)
came before the Court to address a New York City Parks Department
(NYCPD) auditory control policy that affected sound amplification and
modification at the Naumburg Acoustic Bandshell (the Bandshell).58
From 1979 to 1986, RAR put on an annual performance at the Bandshell,
during which time “the city received numerous complaints about
excessive sound amplification at [RAR] concerts from park users and
residents of areas adjacent to the park” where the Bandshell was located.59
In response to the complaints, the NYCPD developed a set of guidelines
for those wishing to use the Bandshell.60 Ultimately, the NYCPD
determined that the city could best ensure sound quality at the Bandshell
without disturbing the local community by providing equipment
appropriate for the venue, as well as personnel trained to operate such
equipment.61
The Court began its analysis by noting that the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals applied the correct standard in that “[c]ontent neutral time,
place and manner regulations are permissible so long as they are narrowly
tailored to serve a substantial government interest and do not unreasonably
limit alternative avenues of expression.”62 The Court then clarified that
such restrictions must be “‘justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, . . . narrowly tailored to serve a significant

56. Id.
57. See id.
58. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784 (1989).
59. Id. at 785.
60. Id. at 785–87.
61. Id. at 787.
62. Id. at 789 (alteration in original) (quoting Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d
367, 370 (2d Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)). When RAR challenged
the NYCPD measures, the trial court concluded those measures were constitutional, but the
Second Circuit reversed the decision on appeal. Id. at 784.
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governmental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for
communication.’”63
The crux of RAR’s argument was that the NYCPD policy could not
be content neutral “because it [was] based upon the quality, and thus the
content, of the speech being regulated.”64 However, the Court held that
the “government ‘ha[s] a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from
unwelcome noise,’”65 specifically noting that “[t]his interest is perhaps at
its greatest when government seeks to protect ‘“the well-being,
tranquility, and privacy of the home.”’”66 Finally, the Court concluded
that a governmental regulation should be viewed in relation to the general
concern the regulation seeks to address, rather than on a case-by-case
basis.67
6.

2004: Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board

In 2004, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined whether
speech considered to be a “true threat” is protected under the First
Amendment.68 Adam Porter, a fourteen-year-old, drew a picture of his
high school, East Ascension High School (EAHS), one night while he was
at home.69 The Court described the picture as “crudely drawn, depicting
the school under a state of siege by a gasoline tanker truck, missile
launcher, helicopter, and various armed persons.”70 The sketch also
included inappropriate words and phrases, some of which were directed
at the EAHS principal.71 However, the sketch remained tucked safely
away in the privacy of his home, until a friend, Andrew Breen, came upon
the sketch pad and used it for his own drawing.72
While transporting the sketchpad to school, Breen and another
student flipped through the pages of the sketch pad and happened upon
Porter’s drawing.73 Breen then showed the picture to his bus driver, who

63. Id. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)).
64. Id. at 792.
65. Id. at 796 (alteration in original) (quoting City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806 (1984) (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949))).
66. Id. (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988)).
67. Id. at 801.
68. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 618 (5th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 1062 (2005).
69. Id. at 611.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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in turn showed it to Breen’s school principal.74 After a series of inquiries,
the principal expelled Porter from school after it was determined that he
drew the picture.75 Both Porter and Breen filed a cause of action, claiming
their First Amendment rights were violated.76 They argued that the
artwork qualified as protected speech under the First Amendment and,
therefore, punishing the students for their protected speech was an
infringement on their right of free speech.77
The Court began with the notion that “school officials may regulate
student speech when they can demonstrate that such speech would
‘substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the
rights of other students.’”78 The court next cited another “class” of speech
not protected by the First Amendment: true threats.79 A “true threat” is
speech that would lead a reasonable person to believe, when viewed
objectively, that the speech is a “serious expression of an intent to cause a
present or future harm.”80
The court determined that a sketch drawn in the privacy of one’s own
home and stored for two years before being taken to a separate school by
a third party cannot meet the threshold of being a “true threat” as described
above.81 As a matter of fact, “to lose the protection of the First
Amendment and be lawfully punished, the threat must be intentionally or
knowingly communicated to either the object of the threat or a third
person.”82 This requirement of intentional or knowing communication of
a threat is a crucial bar against those who would take offense when faced
with discussions of general opinions or policies—as on public college and
university campuses.
7. 2014: McCullen v. Coakley
Recently, the Court evaluated the issue of protected speech as it
pertains to “public fora.”
In 2014, the Court determined the
constitutionality of a Massachusetts law that restricted speech in certain

74. Id. at 611.
75. Id. at 612.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 612–13.
78. Id. at 615 (quoting Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 442 (5th
Cir.1996)). This standard will be addressed in detail in Part II, which specifically discusses free
speech that happens on school property.
79. Id. at 616.
80. Id. (quoting Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002)).
81. Id. at 617–18.
82. Id. at 616 (first emphasis added).
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areas around abortion clinics.83 The statute in question established a
“buffer zone” of thirty-five feet within “any portion of an entrance, exit or
driveway of a reproductive health care facility,” which increased the size
of the previous eighteen-foot buffer zone.84 In essence, the statute
prevented anyone who was not a patient, employee, first responder, or
other person “acting within the scope of their employment” from
approaching the entrances and driveways of a reproductive health clinic
unless they were using the sidewalk “solely for the purpose of reaching a
destination other than such facility.”85
The Court began by noting that the statute “regulate[d] access to
‘public way[s]’ and ‘sidewalk[s].’”86 These areas, the Court opined,
“occupy a ‘special position in terms of First Amendment protection’
because of their historic role as sites for discussion and debate.”87
Undeniably, “[t]hese places . . . ‘have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.’”88 Similarly, “the First Amendment’s purpose [is] ‘to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail.’”89
Furthermore, the Court noted that the actions of the petitioners—
“sidewalk counseling,” and, more importantly, handing out fliers—were
akin to “handing out leaflets in the advocacy of a politically controversial
viewpoint . . . [and] are the essence of First Amendment expression.”90
These factors—coupled with the size of the “buffer zones” and the
“special position” of sidewalks in the scheme of First Amendment
protections—led the Court to conclude that the Massachusetts statute was
an unconstitutional restriction of free speech.91
As evidenced by a litany of cases, the Court carved several small
exceptions from the body of First Amendment speech protections: the
“circumstances and nature” test cemented in the Schenck decision;92 the

83. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2525 (2014).
84. Id. at 2526 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266 § 120E½(b) (2018)). “[T]he
Massachusetts Legislature amended the statute in 2007, replacing the six-foot no-approach
zones . . . with a 35-foot fixed buffer zone from which individuals are categorically excluded.”
Id.
85. Id. (quoting § 120E½(b)(1)–(4)).
86. Id. at 2528 (first alteration added) (quoting § 120E½(b)).
87. Id. at 2529 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983)).
88. Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009)).
89. Id. (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)).
90. Id. at 2536 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995)).
91. See id. at 2536–41.
92. See supra Section I.A.1.
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handful of unprotected “classes” of speech outlined in Chaplinsky;93 the
distinction between speech having even the most minuscule social
significance from that outweighed by a “social interest in order and
morality” as described in Roth;94 the declaration that statements of
political opposition are protected no matter how crude as determined in
Watts;95 the critical “[c]ontent neutral time, place and manner” exception
stated in Ward;96 the “true threat” standard defined in Porter;97 and the
“public fora” exception outlined in McCullen.98 Together, these
exceptions encapsulate the current distinction between protected and
unprotected speech in the general sphere of public discourse, and it is upon
this foundation that the Court has based its decisions regarding speech
protections in public schools.
B. First Amendment Protections for Students in a School Environment
Just as historical developments have impacted the trajectory of First
Amendment jurisprudence, the issue of protected speech at public schools
has also been directly impacted by cultural and social happenings in U.S.
history. For example, the late 1960s were a tumultuous time and led to an
increase in political activism among the younger population.99
Particularly, involvement in the Vietnam conflict drew stark lines among
the American people, and students began protesting the hostilities.100
93. See supra Section I.A.2.
94. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
95. See supra Section I.A.4.
96. See supra Section I.A.5.
97. See supra Section I.A.6.
98. See supra Section I.A.7.
99. Kenneth T. Walsh, The 1960s: A Decade of Promise and Heartbreak, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Mar. 9, 2010, 4:00 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/03/09/the1960s-a-decade-of-promise-and-heartbreak.
By the end of the decade, [President] Kennedy had been assassinated, along with
his brother Robert and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. America’s cities had
become Powder Kegs as African-Americans, despite historic gains toward legal
equality, became more impatient than ever at being second-class citizens. Women
began demanding their rights in unprecedented numbers. Young people and their
parents felt a widening generation gap as seen in their differing perceptions of
patriotism, drug use, sexuality, and the work ethic. The now familiar culture wars
between liberals and conservatives caused angry divisions over law and order,
busing, racial preferences, abortion, the Vietnam War, and America’s use of
military force abroad.
Id.
100. See id. (“[T]he number of college students doubled between 1940 and 1960 to 3.6
million, creating a huge pool of high-minded if sometimes misguided activists with the
motivation and time to devote to political and social causes.”).
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Born of this wave of student activism was a new question regarding the
freedom of speech afforded to students of public schools.
1.

1969: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District

In 1969, a group of students attending public schools in Des Moines,
Iowa, staged a protest against the conflict in Vietnam.101 Specifically, the
students decided to show solidarity for an end to the Vietnam conflict by
wearing black armbands.102 Once aware of the students’ plan to wear the
armbands at school, the principals of several Des Moines schools
instituted a policy, which stated “any student wearing an armband to
school would be asked to remove it, and if he refused he would be
suspended until he returned without the armband.”103 The petitioners in
Tinker violated this policy and were suspended, not returning until after
the scheduled protest period had lapsed.104
At the outset of its discussion, the Court’s position was very clear:
“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”105 Furthermore,
the Court noted that it is crucial “not to strangle the free mind at its source
and [to] teach youth to discount important principles of our government
as mere platitudes.”106
However, the Court did not discount the need for order and civility.107
In fact, the Court indicated that if the issue “relate[d] to [the] regulation
of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style, or deportment,”
then the regulation of speech in this case might hold water.108 The
regulation was not directed at any speech deemed to be aggressive,
disruptive, or otherwise detrimental to the learning environment at the
school.109 To the contrary, the Court made clear there was “no evidence
whatever of [the] petitioners’ interference, actual or nascent, with the
101. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 506.
106. Id. at 507 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
107. See id. (“[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials . . . to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools.”).
108. See id. at 507–08.
109. Id. at 508.
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schools’ work or of collision with the rights of other students to be secure
and to be let alone.”110
In beginning its analysis, the Court made a powerful statement:
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance
is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any
departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any
variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any word
spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates
from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk, and our
history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of
openness—that is the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this
relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.111

The Court found no “evidence that the school authorities had reason
to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially
interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other
students.”112 As there was no evidence indicating a particular disturbance
that the school sought to avoid, it was determined that “the action of the
school authorities appear[ed] to have been based upon an urgent wish to
avoid the controversy which might result from the expression . . . of
opposition to this Nation’s part in the conflagration in Vietnam.”113 The
Court also noted that “the school authorities did not purport to prohibit the
wearing of all symbols of political or controversial significance.”114
The Court succinctly reiterated the theme of their decision: “The
prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least without
evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference
with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.”115
Furthermore, “[f]reedom of expression would not truly exist if the right
could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has
provided as a safe haven for crackpots.”116
Tinker was the flagship case for protected speech in public schools
and has been cited, at length, in several other First Amendment cases in
the years since it was decided.117 Throughout those cases, the Court
110. Id.
111. Id. at 508–09 (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 509.
113. Id. at 510.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 511.
116. Id. at 513.
117. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch.
Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615–16 (5th Cir. 2004).
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repeatedly acknowledged the importance of protected speech to the
educational process—thus, the foundation for free speech in public
schools was laid.
2. 1972: Healy v. James
In 1972, the sociopolitical climate was similar to Tinker—“[a]
climate of unrest prevailed on many college campuses in [the] country.
There had been widespread civil disobedience on some campuses,
accompanied by the seizure of buildings, vandalism, and arson.”118 Only
three years after Tinker was decided, students at Central Connecticut State
College (CCSC) brought suit against school officials for failing to
recognize their student organization.119 The petitioners in this case sought
to establish a chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), an
organization present on campuses across the country—one which had
been deemed “a catalytic force during this period.”120
Petitioners complied with CCSC procedures for getting their
organization officially recognized by the school, including filing an
official request with the Student Affairs Committee (SAC).121 The official
request listed three specific reasons for the creation and existence of the
new SDS chapter:
It would provide “a forum of discussion and self-education for
students developing an analysis of American society”; it would serve
as “an agency for integrating thought with action so as to bring about
constructive changes”; and it would endeavor to provide “a
coordinating body for relating the problems of leftist students” with
other interested groups on campus and in the community.122

Despite agreeing that the statement of SDS was “clear and
unobjectionable on its face,”123 the SAC made further inquiries into the
organization’s motives and associations. As a result, the SAC requested
additional filing by SDS regarding affiliations with any national
organization.124 Ultimately, although SAC did recommend SDS for
official recognition, the President of CCSC denied their recommendation,
because “[h]e found that the organization’s philosophy was antithetical to

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Healy, 408 U.S. at 171.
Id. at 172–77.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 172.
Id. (quoting Healy v. James, 445 F.2d 1122, 1132–39 (2d Cir. 1971)).
Id.
Id. at 172–73.
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the school’s policies, and that the group’s independence [from other SDS
chapters] was doubtful.”125
The Court began by reiterating not only its position that public
schools are subject to the First Amendment as it pertains to free speech,
but also that the need for order does not mean that protections afforded by
the First Amendment should be substantially weakened on college
campuses.126 “Quite to the contrary, ‘[t]he vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools.’”127 The Court also noted the importance of shielding
First Amendment protections from both direct attack and “more subtle
governmental interference.”128
The Court concluded that failing to officially recognize SDS as a
student organization impacted the students’ “ability to participate in the
intellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue its stated
purpose,” and that “[s]uch impediments cannot be viewed as
insubstantial.”129 The Court also noted that “‘guilt by association alone,
without [establishing] that an individual’s association poses the threat
feared by the Government,’ is an impermissible basis upon which to deny
First Amendment rights.”130 Ultimately, it was the Court’s position that
the students seeking to establish a chapter of the SDS could not have their
First Amendment rights limited in this way, and that “[a]s repugnant as
these views may have been, especially to one with [the President’s]
responsibility, the mere expression of [those views] would not justify the
denial of First Amendment rights.”131
In addition to applying First Amendment protections to speech at
public colleges and universities, the Court in its holding also declared that
merely expressing an opinion, even a “repugnant” one, is not grounds for
punishment.132 In other words, the exchange of ideas and opinions at
public colleges and universities should not be subject to arbitrary
censorship or punishment.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
(1967)).
131.
132.

Id. at 174–75 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 180.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
Id. at 183 (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960)).
Id. at 181–82.
Id. at 186 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265
Id. at 187.
Id. at 187–88.
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3. 2001: Bonnell v. Lorenzo
In 2001, nearly thirty years after Healy, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals was tasked with addressing the ability to restrict speech on
college campuses.133 Bonnell was an English teacher at Macomb
Community College (MCC), a position he had held since 1967.134
Between February 1998 and September 1999, several students filed
complaints against Bonnell alleging that he had used inappropriate,
distasteful language.135 Each of these accusations resulted in verbal
warnings and in-person meetings conducted by his superiors at MCC, as
well as written memoranda.136 The first warning stated:
Unless germane to discussion of appropriate course materials and
thus a constitutionally protected act of academic freedom, your
utterance in the classroom of such words as ‘fuck,’ ‘cunt[,]’ and
‘pussy’ may serve as a reasonable basis for concluding as a matter of
law that you are fostering a learning environment hostile to women, a
form of sexual harassment.137

Bonnell was initially placed on suspension; however, the district
court granted a preliminary injunction and his position was reinstated.138
Upon returning to class, another student filed a complaint against
petitioner, leading Bonnell to bring this action.139
The court began by outlining the existing sociopolitical atmosphere
at the time.
Currently, a debate rages concerning the degree to which speech
that is sexually or racially harassing is protected. And nowhere is that
debate more heated than on university campuses, historically
committed to unrestricted inquiry and exploring of ideas, yet morally
obligated to promoting respect . . . .140

The court also noted that any actions taken by the government to limit
or restrict speech must be based on something other than the wish to

133. See Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 802 (6th Cir. 2001).
134. Id. at 802–03.
135. Id. at 803–05. In fact, one accusation alleged that Bonnell “displayed a lack of
maturity, sensitivity, and responsibility, by taking advantage of the conversations to express his
own previous sexual experiences.” Id. at 804.
136. Id. at 803–06.
137. Id. at 803.
138. Id. at 808.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 810 (quoting Beverly Earle & Anita Cava, The Collision of Rights and a Search
for Limits: Free Speech in the Academy and Freedom from Sexual Harassment on Campus, 18
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282, 283 (1997)).
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“avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint.”141 However, it is important to consider the nature
of the speech at issue as well:
“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a
given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Speech which can
be “fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community” touches upon matters of public
concern.142

In evaluating Bonnell’s speech, the court echoed its “circumstances
and nature” analysis from Schenck by noting that context is an important
issue when judging whether speech falls under the First Amendment.143
Furthermore,
the protection afforded to offensive messages does not always
embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling
audience cannot avoid it. Indeed, it may not be the content of the
speech, as much as the deliberate verbal or visual assault, that justifies
proscription. Even in a public forum, one of the reasons we tolerate a
protester’s right to wear a jacket expressing his opposition to
government policy in vulgar language is because offended viewers can
effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by
averting their eyes.144

Applying these considerations to the facts of Bonnell, where the
petitioner was a professor and the audience is his students, it is clear that
a unique relationship exists “such that [the] students are a ‘captive
audience’ who may find themselves intimidated by the person who has
the ability to pass upon them a poor grade.”145 In fact, if a teacher’s
language “‘taken in context . . . constitute[s] a deliberate, superfluous
attack on a “captive audience” with no academic purpose or
justification,’” that language will not be protected.146
As Bonnell makes clear, it is not impossible to restrict speech on
college or university campuses.147 Truly,
141. See id. at 811 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
509 (1969)).
142. Id. at 812 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48, 146 (1983)).
143. See id. at 819; see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding
that the “circumstances and nature” of speech can determine whether it is protected under the
First Amendment).
144. Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 819 (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000)).
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1986)).
147. Id. at 826–27.
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just as we “hope that whenever we decide to tolerate intolerant speech,
the speaker as well as the audience will understand that we do so to
express our deep commitment to the value of tolerance—a value
protected by every clause in the single sentence called the First
Amendment[,]” we also hope that whenever we decide that intolerant
speech should be restricted, it is understood that we do so with no less
commitment to the value of tolerance and the First Amendment in
which it is enshrined.148

Just as the Court defined the parameters of First Amendment speech
protections in the general public sphere, complete with several tests and
classifications,149 the Court also evaluated whether those parameters
applied in public classrooms across the country.150 Whether by
determining that an “undifferentiated fear” is not enough to stifle speech
in a public high school where a free exchange of ideas is crucial to the
development of young minds,151 by extending that same protection to
public colleges and universities by solidifying the need for constitutional
freedoms in American public schools,152 or by distinguishing
uncomfortable academic speech from “‘a deliberate, superfluous attack on
a “captive audience,”’”153 the courts made clear that the First Amendment
applies to speech in all public arenas, not just a street corner or city hall.
It is against this backdrop that we turn to addressing safe space policies as
the most recent affront to free speech on public college and university
campuses.
II. HISTORICAL ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT SPEECH IN THE ACADEMIC
SETTING: SAFE SPACE PREDECESSORS
As outlined above, the courts have largely been hesitant to uphold
restrictions on free speech, whether on a public street or on a college
campus.154 That has not stopped many schools from trying to implement
various methods of restricting speech. One such method can be seen in
speech codes.155 Though the general purpose of speech codes is “to
prevent a rise in discriminatory harassment,” the courts have been equally

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
1986)).
154.
155.

Id. at 827 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
See supra Sections I.A.1–7.
See supra Sections I.B.1–3.
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 819 (quoting Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.
See supra Part I.
See Hudson & Nott, supra note 19.

2019]

FREE SPEECH AND HIGHER EDUCATION

391

hesitant to allow these restrictions of speech as well.156 Therefore, to
better understand how safe space policies are in violation of the First
Amendment, it is important to examine the few exceptions where the
courts have ultimately allowed limited restrictions of free speech on public
college and university campuses.
A. Speech Codes: Overbroad, Vague, and Unconstitutional
A perfect example of an unconstitutional speech restriction on college
campuses occurred in the late 1980s. In 1989, several incidents occurred
at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor that prompted school officials
to reconsider their anti-harassment policy.157 Such incidents included the
circulation of fliers containing derogatory language referring to black
students and the broadcast of racist jokes by the campus radio.158 These
incidents, followed by several hearings and revisions of the original
speech code, ultimately led to the implementation of the school’s “policy
on Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment,” which sought to
regulate speech in certain locations on campus as well as targeted speech
and actions.159
The policy itself was designed to apply “specifically to ‘[e]ducational
and academic centers, such as classroom buildings, libraries, research
laboratories, recreation and study centers.’”160 The policies targeted
[a]ny behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an
individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status,
handicap[,] or Vietnam-era veteran status, . . . [including s]exual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and verbal or physical conduct
that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of sex or
sexual orientation . . . .161

Anyone found to be in violation of the new policy could be subject to
sanctions including: “(1) formal reprimand; (2) community service; (3)
class attendance; (4) restitution; (5) removal from University housing; (6)
suspension from specific courses and activities; (7) suspension; [or] (8)
expulsion.”162

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 853–55 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
Id. at 854.
Id. at 856–58.
Id. at 856.
Id.
Id. at 857.
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The court began its analysis by distinguishing protected speech from
“mere conduct.”163 Indeed, there are many state and federal prohibitions
on discrimination that are not in conflict with the First Amendment; the
same is true for abusive or harassing conduct.164 The court also reiterated
the “fighting words” doctrine developed in Chaplinsky, and indicated that
colleges and universities could regulate such speech so long as the
prohibition was not implemented “because [the university] disagreed with
[the] ideas or messages sought to be conveyed.”165 The court also noted
that “[a] law regulating speech will be deemed overbroad if it sweeps
within its ambit a substantial amount of protected speech along with that
which it may legitimately regulate.”166
Using this framework, the court considered each of the following
incidents in turn: a student who commented on “the origins or ‘curability’
of homosexuality in the School of Social Work;”167 a business student who
read “an allegedly homophobic limerick” while participating in an in-class
exercise;168 and a student who merely commented that “he had heard that
minorities had a difficult time in the course and that he had heard that they
were not treated fairly.”169 The district court noted that in handling the
complaints under the school’s policy, administrators failed to consider
both the subjective intent of the speakers and any First Amendment
protections that might be implicated.170 In fact, the court opined that such
enforcement was “constitutionally indistinguishable from a full blown
prosecution.”171
Ultimately, the court concluded that “it was simply impossible to
discern any limitation on [the policy’s] scope or any conceptual distinction
between protected and unprotected conduct.”172 Furthermore, the court
reiterated the importance of affording speech the broadest First
Amendment protection possible.173 As such, the district court held that
163. Id. at 861.
164. Id. at 861–62.
165. Id. at 862–63 (citations omitted); see supra Section I.A.2.
166. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 864 (citations omitted).
167. Id. at 865.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 866 (citation omitted).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 867.
173. See id. at 869 (second alteration in original) (“[E]ven if speech ‘exceed[s] all the
proper bounds of moderation, the consolation must be that the evil likely to spring from the
violent discussion will probably be less . . . than if the terrors of the law were brought to bear to
prevent the discussion.’” (quoting T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 429 (Da Capo ed. 1972))).
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the policy implemented by the University of Michigan was an
unconstitutional restriction of protected speech and, therefore, could not
be enforced as written, with an exception granted to physical behavior or
physical conduct.174
B. Anti-Harassment Policies: Speech Codes Reborn
The decision in Doe seemed to mark the beginning of the end of
campus speech codes.175 However, despite courts dismissing several
speech-restricting policies for being vague and/or overbroad, many public
colleges and universities have been successful in restricting speech with
so-called “anti-harassment” policies.176 In reality, “hate speech policies
not only persist, but they have actually increased in number following a
series of court decisions that ostensibly found many to be
unconstitutional.”177
Some “[f]eminist and anti-racist legal scholars [have] argued that the
First Amendment should not safeguard language that inflict[s] emotional
injury through racist or sexist stigmatization.”178 Therefore, one possible
reason for the prevalence of “anti-harassment” policies is their tendency
to “punish harassing speech and conduct, as opposed to offensive
speech.”179 Harassment arises from “[w]ords, conduct, or action . . . that,
being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms, or causes substantial
emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.”180
Similarly, speech is harassing if it is used “to annoy
persistently; . . . bother continually; pester; [or] persecute.”181 Applying
these definitions, harassing speech appears very similar to the “fighting
words” from Chaplinsky in that harassment would be likely to “inflict

174. Id. at 853.
175. David L. Hudson, Jr. & Lata Nott, Hate Speech & Campus Speech Codes, FREEDOM
F. INST., https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-ofspeech-2/free-speech-on-public-college-campuses-overview/hate-speech-campus-speechcodes/ [https://perma.cc/RP2S-MQ5X].
In 1995, the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the University of
Central Michigan’s speech code in Dambrot v. Central Michigan University. That
same year, in Corry v. Stanford, a California state court ruled that Stanford
University’s speech code violated the First Amendment. Some First Amendment
advocates cheered these court decisions as the demise of campus speech codes.
Id.
176. See id.
177. Id. (quoting George Mason law professor Jon Gould).
178. Shulevitz, supra note 8.
179. Hudson & Nott, supra note 19.
180. Harassment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
181. Harass, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004).
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injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” and therefore
be punishable as unprotected speech.182
However, some schools have gone one step further by implementing
policies that target alleged “bias incidents.”183 According to the
University of Massachusetts Amherst, bias incidents are
[a]cts against people or property that do not appear to constitute a
crime or actionable discrimination, but which may intimidate, mock,
degrade, or threaten a member or group because of actual or perceived
age, ancestry or ethnicity, color, creed, disability, gender, gender
identity or expression, height, immigration or citizenship status,
marital status, ex-offender status, national origin, veteran status, race,
religion, religious practice, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status,
weight or any combination of these factors.184

This language, and its implications, run directly counter to the
jurisprudence surrounding First Amendment protections.
This commitment to free expression must be unwavering, because
there exist many situations where, in the short run, it appears
advantageous to limit speech to solve pressing social problems, such
as discriminatory harassment. If a balancing approach is applied,
these pressing and tangible short run concerns are likely to outweigh
the more amorphous and long run benefits of free speech. However,
the suppression of speech, even where the speech’s content appears to
have little value and great costs, amounts to governmental thought
control.185

This is not to say that the Court has granted complete deference to the
First Amendment to the exclusion of current societal needs. Indeed, the
Court has provided a solution should the need arise:
We have previously noted the First Amendment virtues of targeted
injunctions as alternatives to broad, prophylactic measures. Such an
injunction “regulates the activities, and perhaps the speech, of a
group,” but only “because of the group’s past actions in the context of
a specific dispute between real parties.”186

182. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
183. See, e.g., What are Acts of Bias and Hate?, UMASSAMHERST: UMATTER AT UMASS,
https://www.umass.edu/umatter/bias [https://perma.cc/744W-6PYL].
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Hudson & Nott, supra note 19 (quoting UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 774 F.
Supp. 1163, 1174 n.9 (E.D. Wis. 1991)).
186. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2538 (2014) (quoting Madsen v. Women’s
Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762 (1994)).
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In essence, this would allow someone who has been the subject of
harassing speech to obtain judicial intervention should college or
university officials be unwilling, or unable, to act.187
Understanding the nature of free speech and its importance to
discourse at public colleges and universities, as well as the remedies
available to individual parties, is the first step to understanding why safe
space policies are inherently unconstitutional. However, it is equally
important to understand the real-world implications of safe spaces,
including the arguments offered by those in favor of restricting speech.
Therefore, those rationales must be tested against the bulwark of
jurisprudence in favor of the free exchange of ideas that pervades
institutions of higher learning.
III. SAFE SPACE POLICIES: UNCONSTITUTIONAL, HARMFUL
RESTRICTIONS OF SPEECH
It bears repeating that the safe spaces referred to are not to protect
students, faculty, and staff from physical injury or harm, but from mental
or emotional harm.188 Each person naturally has subjective standards of
what constitutes mental or emotional harm, however, which in turn
severely frustrates speech regulations that “are permissible so long as they
are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest and do not
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of expression.”189
A. Safe Spaces Are Unconstitutional Restrictions of Speech
When asked to justify the implementation of safe space policies, the
most common answer is to protect students from unpleasant or
uncomfortable subjects, such as sexual assault.190 Some argue, and rightly
so, that the right of students to learn about sexual assault does not negate
other students’ need for safety.191
No one is trying to suggest that students should be utterly inundated
with uncomfortable or unpleasant information at all times and in all areas
of campus. Nor is anyone trying to minimalize or discount the importance
of victims of sexual assault or their experiences. However, administrators
at public colleges and universities have a duty to keep their students safe,

187. Id.
188. Holley & Steiner, supra note 13.
189. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789 (1989) (emphasis added) (quoting
Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 370 (2d Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 491
U.S. 781 (1989)).
190. Rafidi, supra note 15.
191. Id.
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and this means that allowing speakers to present information relating to
sexual assault awareness and prevention is crucial to that duty.192
With the truly pervasive nature of sexual assault and sexual violence
gaining national recognition in recent years, it is impossible to say that
disseminating information to public college and university students
regarding sexual assault awareness and prevention lacks “even the
slightest redeeming social importance.”193 Undeniably, one look at the
current social climate surrounding the apparent prevalence of sexual
assault and sexual violence would indicate that educating public college
and university students clearly qualifies as a “matter[ ] of public
concern.”194 Therefore, using safe space policies to limit speech, not only
in the context of sexual assault awareness and prevention, but also other
matters of equal importance and concern, clearly contradicts the purpose
of First Amendment speech protections.
Rafidi also chides a decision by the University of Chicago that
eliminated safe spaces from its campus.195 He takes issue with the fact
that removing safe spaces from campuses would leave students with
nowhere to go during or after attending a particular presentation.196
However, the rationale behind the University’s decision is simple: if
students are uncomfortable with a certain topic or presentation, they are
free to leave.197 In fact, they are free not to attend such presentations in
the first place.
If this argument sounds familiar, it is because it was the court’s
holding in Bonnell when they acknowledged students in a classroom are

192. See Gersen, supra note 17 (“We are currently in the middle of a national effort to
reform how sexual violence is addressed on college campuses. This effort is critical, given the
apparent prevalence of sexual violence among students.”); see also Campus Sexual Violence:
Statistics, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/campus-sexual-violence [https://perma.cc/
N7Y5-SRVW].
193. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (holding that speech bearing even
miniscule social importance deserves First Amendment protection).
194. Id. at 488 (explaining that matters of public concern may be discussed freely and
publicly); see also Gersen, supra note 17.
195. Rafidi, supra note 15. It is important to note that the University of Chicago is a
private institution, and as such, it is significantly less beholden to many aspects of the
Constitution, including the First Amendment. Therefore, the decision to forego speech
regulations in acknowledgement of the greater need for open discourse among students at
colleges and universities should serve as a shining example to those public colleges and
universities that would consider regulating speech on their campuses.
196. See id.
197. Id. But see Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 819 (6th Cir. 2001) (commenting that
students in a classroom setting are a “captive audience” and susceptible to intimidation
leveraged against them by the person in charge of grading them).

2019]

FREE SPEECH AND HIGHER EDUCATION

397

a “captive audience.”198 However, unlike Bonnell, students at the
University of Chicago would only be subjected to uncomfortable or
unpleasant content if they chose to attend a presentation.199
Rafidi also suggests that while “[s]afe spaces are useful . . . not all
students are entitled to have safe spaces.”200 This is a troubling
proposition because it could allow campus administrators to handpick
which students are “entitled” to safe spaces and therefore what speech
should be allowed or restricted, something that cannot be reconciled with
the First Amendment.201 This would be a direct contradiction to First
Amendment jurisprudence in general, and specifically the narrow
tailoring/unreasonable limitation test established in Ward.202 The
implementation of such a proposition would also contradict the Court’s
holding that “the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at
least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and
substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not
constitutionally permissible.”203
Rafdi’s proposition also suggests that only certain students and
organizations should be allowed access to safe spaces; the corollary, of
course, is that other students and organizations should be prohibited from
accessing safe spaces.204 Under Rafidi’s proposition, authorities would
not only have the ability to arbitrarily decide what students and
organizations should be permitted to have safe spaces; they would also be
permitted, if not encouraged, to police students’ backgrounds in an effort
to ferret out those who would seek to abuse “safe spaces.”205 Similarly,
allowing administrators to determine which students and organizations are
entitled to safe spaces would be the functional equivalent of allowing them
to handpick what speech to permit and what to restrict, which is akin to
“governmental thought control.”206
Mirroring Rafidi’s position, RaeAnn Pickett wrote a similar article
praising safe spaces as necessary. Pickett chided the University of

198. Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 819.
199. Rafidi, supra note 15.
200. Id.
201. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (“Freedom
of expression would not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a
benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots.”).
202. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789 (1989).
203. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (emphasis added).
204. See Rafidi, supra note 15.
205. Id. (“Students may be taking advantage of safe spaces . . . .”).
206. See Hudson & Nott, supra note 19 (quoting UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 774
F. Supp. 1163, 1174 n.9 (E.D. Wis. 1991)).
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Chicago for ending its policies regarding “trigger warnings” and safe
spaces.207 While Pickett concedes that the policies were ended to further
promote academic freedom, she also improperly places the focus of her
argument on the subjective feelings of the students.208 To the contrary,
the Court has repeatedly held that speech cannot be restricted by the
government solely because it is unpleasant, uncomfortable, or even
blatantly offensive to those who hear it.209 Perhaps the Court said it best:
“‘The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth “out of a
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection.”’”210
One such example of “authoritative selection” was discussed in an
article by Flemming Rose:
[I]n the aftermath of a recent visit by leading feminist intellectual and
cultural critic Laura Kipnis, [six professors at Wellesley College]
proposed setting up a censorship committee to vet speakers in order to
make sure that ‘disempowered groups’ would be protected from ideas
and speech they find offensive and harmful.211

207. Pickett, supra note 16.
208. See id. (“[Ending] the [university’s] polic[ies] puts many students in the
uncomfortable position of entering spaces that may or may not be safe for them to learn, interact,
and share in—and puts the onus on them to leave or to endure the situation.”).
209. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (emphasis added) (“[D]ebate on
public issues . . . may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks
on government and public officials.”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)
(emphasis added) (“All ideas . . . —unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to
the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of [the First Amendment].”); see
also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187 (1972) (“As repugnant as these views may have been,
especially to one with [the President’s] responsibility, the mere expression of them would not
justify the denial of First Amendment rights.”).
210. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (alteration
in original) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
211. Rose, supra note 1. Wellesley College, like the University of Chicago, is a private
institution not subject to the same standard under First Amendment jurisprudence. Philip J.
Faccenda and Kathleen Ross, Constitutional and Statutory Regulation of Private Colleges and
Universities, 9 VAL. U. L. REV. 539, 540–41 (1975).
An individual alleging that a private educational institution has deprived him of
his constitutional rights must show that the institution acted on behalf of the state—
as an arm of the state, which if proven, subjects the private school to the
jurisdiction of federal court. . . . If state action is not shown, a private school can
be sued only as an individual citizen and the reservoir of constitutional protections
and procedural tools available when the private school is sued as an agent of the
state are not available to the plaintiff.
Id.
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Establishing censorship committees at public colleges and
universities would certainly qualify as governmental speech regulation.212
For example, such a committee could be tasked with predicting whether a
particular speaker or event would cause subjective feelings of discomfort
or uneasiness among certain students.213 This raises the question, though,
of how this committee would gauge what level of discomfort or
uneasiness would merit the censorship, or outright prohibition, of a
speaker or event? In all likelihood, they would err on the side of caution
and simply disallow anything that they thought might make the student
body uncomfortable to any degree, reminiscent of the “undifferentiated
fear” standard that the Court denounced in Tinker.214
Now, proponents of censorship committees would argue that bringing
“‘guest speakers with controversial and objectionable beliefs’ to campus
‘impose[s] on the liberty of students, staff and faculty.’”215 However, the
Court has held that “state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism . . . [and] students may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.”216
Furthermore,
[a]lthough such measures have been deliberately approved by men of
great genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual and
State were wholly different from those upon which our institutions
rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any Legislature could impose
such restrictions upon the people of a state without doing violence to
both letter and spirit of the Constitution.217

Indeed, this bizarre dissonance between language that can be
regulated in an academic setting and language that students feel should be
regulated is underscored by an “incident” that occurred at a Smith College
alumnae event in the fall of 2014.218 This incident involved an
“[argument] against the use of the euphemism ‘the n-word’ when teaching
212. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 186. “‘[G]uilt by association alone, without [establishing]
that an individual’s association poses the threat feared by the Government,’ is an impermissible
basis upon which to deny First Amendment rights.” Id. (first alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967)).
213. Id.
214. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967)).
215. Rose, supra note 1.
216. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
217. Id. at 511–12 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)).
218. Shulevitz, supra note 8. Smith College is a private institution, shielded from the First
Amendment in the same way as the University of Chicago and Wellesley. See Faccenda &
Ross, supra note 211. This incident illustrates the inherent problem with restricting speech
based on subjective standards, such as how students may “feel” about the speech in question.
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American history or ‘The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn.’”219 To be
clear, it appears that the euphemism, “the n-word,” is what was actually
used in lieu of any derogatory slang; moreover, the euphemism did not
appear directed at anyone.220 In relation to this incident, Kaminer made
the following remark: “It’s amazing to me that [students] can’t distinguish
between racist speech and speech about racist speech, [and] between
racism and discussions [about] racism.”221 This statement perfectly
encapsulates the inherent danger, repeatedly noted by the Court, that arises
when speech is regulated based on subjective feelings of discomfort,
unpleasantness, or inappropriateness.222
In a similar incident, Zineb El Rhazoui, a Charlie Hebdo journalist,
was chided by the University of Chicago student newspaper for allegedly
using her “relative position of power . . . [as a] free pass to make
condescending attacks on a member of the university.”223 Evidently, one
of the students who disagreed with Charlie Hebdo’s “apparent disrespect
for Muslims” was even less pleased when Ms. El Rhazoui stated, “‘Being
Charlie Hebdo means to die because of a drawing,’ and not everyone has
the guts to do that.”224 This interaction, and the subsequent backlash,
illustrates yet another problem with restricting speech based on subjective
feelings of comfort: “[T]he student[s] and [their] defender[s] had
burrowed so deep inside their cocoons, [and] were so overcome by their
own fragility, that they couldn’t see that it was Ms. El Rhazoui who was
in need of a safer space.”225
Furthermore, a Pierce College student was subjected to an arguably
unconstitutional restriction of his free speech rights in fall of the 2016
school year.226 This student, Kevin Shaw, was stopped from distributing
copies of the U.S. Constitution on the grounds of Pierce College for
219. Id.
220. Id.; see Challenging the Ideological Echo Chamber: Free Speech, Civil Discourse,
and Liberal Arts, SOUNDCLOUD (Sept. 22, 2014, 25:30), https://soundcloud.com/sydneysadur/challenging-the-ideological-echo-chamber-free-speech-civil-discourse-and-the-liberalarts.
221. Id. (emphasis added).
222. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (emphasis added) (“All ideas having
even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the [First
Amendment].”).
223. Shulevitz, supra note 8 (“[Zineb] El Rhazoui is an immigrant, a woman, Arab, a
human-rights activist who has known exile, and a journalist living in very real fear of death.”).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See generally Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Damages, Shaw
v. Burke et al., No. CV-17-2386 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2017), 2017 WL 1173731 [hereinafter
Complaint] (challenging the constitutionality of the “free speech area” policy at Pierce College).
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allegedly violating the campus speech policy.227 This policy “restricts the
distribution of literature, including ‘petitions, circulars, leaflets,
newspapers, miscellaneous printed matter and other materials,’ to ‘the
geographical limits of the Free Speech Area’ on each campus.”228 In fact,
the policy goes so far as to state:
Individuals planning to distribute material on campus are required to
go to the Vice President of Student Services Office located on the third
floor of the Student Services Building between the hours of 9:00am
and 4:00pm to: 1. Report his/her presence on campus; 2. Identify the
organization and give the name(s) of the distributor(s) and address of
the organization; [and] 3. Indicate how many people will be
distributing along with the date(s) and time(s) of distribution.229

This policy is similar to the censorship committee suggested by
Wellesley College, except for a crucial difference: Pierce College is a
public college campus.230 Moreover, “‘handing out leaflets in the
advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint . . . is the essence of
First Amendment expression’; ‘[n]o form of speech is entitled to greater
constitutional protection.’”231 By implementing this policy, the Los
Angeles Community College District (of which Pierce College is a
member) is able to quite literally police who is speaking on their campus
as well as what they are speaking about.232 Simply put, enforcing this
policy is fundamentally antithetical to both the spirit and letter of the First
Amendment.233
Additionally, using this speech policy to restrict free speech in such
a way—particularly by defining a particular area in which free speech may
be practiced—effectively makes the rest of the campus a de facto safe

227. Id. at ¶ 8 (emphasis added).
228. Id. at ¶ 9 (citations omitted).
229. Id. at ¶ 11.
230. See Rose, supra note 1.
231. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2536 (2014) (emphasis added) (quoting
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995)).
232. See Complaint, supra note 226, at ¶ 11 (outlining the steps required to obtain a permit
to use the designated free speech area, including disclosure of the content of the speech engaged
in by those applying to use the space).
233. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (“[D]ebate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .”); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969) (“[I]t is this sort of hazardous freedom [of
speech] . . . that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of [all]
Americans . . . .”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“All ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance . . . have the full protection of the [First
Amendment] . . . .”).
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space.234 Therefore, this policy is arguably beyond the scope intended by
the court’s holding in Bonnell, with regard to the principle of captive
audience versus the ability to leave or avoid at will.235 In fact, such
restriction on the ability to exercise free speech sounds much more akin
to the Court’s concern in Tinker that “[f]reedom of expression would not
truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent
government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots.”236
Whether it is a presentation on sexual assault awareness and
prevention,237 an academic discussion about the merits of white-washing
historical pedagogy with euphemisms,238 a presentation by a journalist
whose life and freedom of speech is under constant threat,239 or a student
attempting to distribute copies of the Constitution at Pierce College,240 one
thing is clear: these are not instances of targeted, repetitive, verbal
harassment—the latter form of speech is impermissible under First
Amendment jurisprudence.241 However, the above-mentioned instances
are examples of academic and scholarly discussion, the likes of which
have been deemed constitutionally protected exercises of free speech by
the Court numerous times.242
B. Safe Spaces Harm Students by Limiting Exposure to Concepts and
Ideas That Force Students to Think Critically
Rape law is one subject of the safe space debate that should be of
particular concern to law students, lawyers, judges, and everyone involved
in the legal community.243 In recent years, students have started being
advised that they “should not feel pressured to attend or participate in class
sessions that focus on the law of sexual violence.”244 In fact, “[i]ndividual
234. See Safe Space, supra note 12. Safe spaces are “intended to be free of bias, conflict,
criticism, or potentially threatening actions, ideas, or conversations.” Id. Therefore, it would
make sense that restricting any such conflicts or conversations to a very small, designated area,
effectively frees the rest of the campus from such issues and thereby transforms the campus into
a massive safe space.
235. See Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 819 (6th Cir. 2001); Rafidi, supra note 15.
236. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
237. See, e.g., Rafidi, supra note 15.
238. See, e.g., Shulevitz, supra note 8 (discussing the use of the euphemism “the n-word”
when teaching American History or the Adventures of Huckleberry Finn).
239. Id. (discussing the struggle of Ms. El Rhazoui).
240. Complaint, supra note 226, at ¶ 13.
241. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942); supra Section II.B.
242. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511–12 (1969)
(“[S]tudents may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate.”).
243. See Gersen, supra note 17.
244. Id.
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students often ask teachers not to include the law of rape on exams for fear
that the material would cause them to preform less well.”245 More
troubling still is the notion that teachers should stop teaching rape law
altogether.246
There can be little doubt that sexual assault and violence are very
serious issues that colleges and universities are striving to address—with
many campuses bringing victim-survivors to speak to students about their
experiences and even offer advice.247 Therefore, to suggest that rape law
should not be taught is perplexing, especially when one considers the sad
state of rape law even thirty years ago.
Until the mid-nineteen-eighties, rape law was not taught in law
schools, because it wasn’t considered important or suited to the
rational pedagogy of law-school classrooms. The victims of rape,
most often women, were seen as emotionally involved witnesses,
making it difficult to ascertain what really happened in a private
encounter. This skepticism toward the victim was reflected in the
traditional law of rape, which required a woman to “resist to the
utmost” the physical force used to make her have intercourse. Trials
often included inquiries into a woman’s sexual history, because of the
notion that a woman who wasn’t [a virgin] must have been complicit
in any sex [act] that occurred. Hard-fought feminist reforms attacked
the sexism in rape law, and eventually the topic became a major part
of most law schools’ mandatory criminal-law course.248

It cannot be denied that the topic of rape, and subsequently rape law,
is an intensely uncomfortable subject for most people, particularly those
who have been the victim of sexual violence, sexual assault, and rape.249
This is especially true when professors teach cases “that test the limits of
the rules, and that fall near the rapidly shifting line separating criminal
conduct from legal sex.”250 However, for law students, these cases are

245. Id.
246. Id. (“[S]ome students have even suggested that rape law should not be taught because
of its potential to cause distress.”).
247. See, e.g., Shulevitz, supra note 8.
248. Gersen, supra note 17.
249. Id.; see also Skylar Washington, Let’s Get Comfortable with Being Uncomfortable:
A Discussion About Rape and Sexual Assault, MEDIUM (Mar. 27, 2018), https://medium.com/
gendered-violence/lets-get-comfortable-with-being-uncomfortable-a-discussion-about-rapeand-sexual-assault-937f8fc15dac [https://perma.cc/DNK3-QMS3] (“Whether it’s someone who
has been violated or someone who hasn’t, the word ‘rape’ sets an unpleasant, very devastating
tone that creates a blanket of silence.”).
250. See Gersen, supra note 17.
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arguably more instructive precisely because they help teach not only the
rules but how to apply academic concepts to real-world problems.251
While it may be incredibly uncomfortable to learn about and discuss
the law governing sexual assault, sexual violence, and rape, the fact
remains that knowing how to apply the law to real-world facts to achieve
justice for victims is inarguably a “matter[ ] of public concern,” similar to
the concerns voiced in Roth.252 Furthermore, unlike the speech at issue in
Bonnell, discussion of sexual assault, sexual violence, and rape in a class
where the anticipated educational outcome is a fundamental
understanding of the law governing these issues inarguably meets the
“public concern” standard raised in Bonnell.253
This relates back to the concern that Rafidi expressed about the
possible traumatization of students who are exposed to sexual assault
survivors who come to campuses for the purpose of educating both men
and women about the dangers of sexual violence.254 In fact, there are those
who would seek to keep sexual assault awareness and prevention speakers
from coming to campuses altogether, because “[b]ringing in a speaker like
that could serve to invalidate people’s experiences.”255 However, “[n]ow
more than ever, it is critical that law students develop the ability to engage
productively and analytically in conversations about sexual assault.”256 In
fact, “[i]f the topic of sexual assault were to leave the law-school
classroom, it would be a tremendous loss—above all to victims of sexual
assault.”257 This further serves to underscore the fact that such discussions
are crucial matters of public concern.258
In a similar article, Flemming Rose challenges the idea that students
should be free of conflict and negativity on college and university

251. Id. See generally Jonathan Zimmerman & Emily Robertson, The Case for
Contentious Curricula, ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/
archive/2017/04/the-case-for-contentious-classrooms/524268/ [https://perma.cc/8X3S-7DK6]
(arguing that schools should engage students in contentious subjects so they can “engage in
reasoned, informed debates across society’s myriad differences”).
252. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940)).
253. Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 812 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Speech which can be ‘fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community’
touches upon matters of public concern.” (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146
(1983))).
254. See Rafidi, supra note 15; see also supra Section III.A.
255. Shulevitz, supra note 8.
256. Gersen, supra note 17.
257. Id.
258. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957); Bonnell, 241 F.3d. at 812.
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campuses.259 He recounts an interview with activist and former advisor to
President Obama, Van Jones (a.k.a. Anthony Kapel Jones), who made a
powerful statement about the kind of comfort and safety safe spaces seek
to promote. Jones stated:
I think [safe spaces are] a terrible idea for the following reason: I don’t
want you to be safe ideologically. I don’t want you to be safe
emotionally. I want you to be strong. That’s different. I’m not going
to pave the jungle for you. Put on some boots, and learn how to deal
with adversity. I’m not going to take the weights out of the gym.
That’s the whole point of the gym.
You can’t live on a campus where people say stuff you don’t like? […]
You are creating a kind [o]f liberalism that the minute it crosses the
street into the real world is not just useless but obnoxious and
dangerous. I want you to be offended every single day on this campus.
I want you to be deeply aggrieved and offended and upset and then
learn how to speak back.260

This explains the danger of shielding students from uncomfortable
topics and discussions as well as the reasoning behind why they should
feel uncomfortable in the first place. It also serves as a perfect modern
encapsulation of the Court’s view that “unorthodox ideas, controversial
ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion” are worthy
of the protections of the First Amendment.261
Rose also mentions a speech made by then-President Barack Obama
at a high school in Des Moines, Iowa (home of the famous Tinker
decision), where the president spoke about the importance of experiencing
different perspectives, ideals, and beliefs.262 “[T]he purpose of college is
not just . . . to transmit skills. It’s also . . . to make you a better citizen; to
help you to evaluate information; [and] to help you make your way
through the world.”263 This would be difficult, if not impossible, for
someone who had nothing but their own thoughts, beliefs, and
perspectives on life, society, and everything else.264 Removing challenge

259. Rose, supra note 1.
260. Id. (second alteration in original).
261. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
262. Rose, supra note 1.
263. Id. (quoting President Barak Obama).
264. Id. (emphasis added) (“[I]t was because there was this space where you could interact
with people who didn’t agree with you and had different backgrounds that I then started testing
my own assumptions. And sometimes I changed my mind.”); see also Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969) (“But our Constitution says we must take
this risk . . . that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of
Americans . . . .”).
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and discomfort from the learning environment can be problematic, even
detrimental, to students.
It’s one thing to say that students should not be laughed at for posing
a question or for offering a wrong answer. It’s another to say that
students must never be conscious of their ignorance. It’s one thing to
say that students should not be belittled for a personal preference or
harassed because of an unpopular opinion. It’s another to say that
students must never be asked why their preference and opinions are
different from those of others. It’s one thing to say that students should
be capable of self-revelation. It’s another to say that they must always
like what they see revealed.265

Indeed, it cannot be denied that “[t]he path to self-discovery can be
difficult and stressful.”266 The very real concern raised by many
opponents of safe spaces is that “safe classrooms might result in a
nonacademic environment that stifles student learning.”267 Similarly, a
question is raised when one considers the potential for “one student’s
speaking up in a safe space . . . to seriously harm another student.”268
Moreover, “[a] comment that is perceived as an appropriate critique by
one student might be felt as judgmental or as an attack by another.”269
These subjective feelings, while not invalidated, fail to withstand the
Court’s many denouncements.270
Therefore, students venturing into the academic arena should accept,
first and foremost, that “learning necessarily involves not merely risk, but
the pain of giving up a former condition in favor of a new way of seeing

265. Holley & Steiner, supra note 13, at 51 (quoting Robert Boostrom, “Unsafe Spaces”:
Reflections on a Specimen of Educational Jargon, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Educational Research Association (Mar. 24, 1997), made available at
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED407686.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV8J-J2WD]).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 52. “[O]ne must question whether students feel safe only in an environment
where their beliefs go unquestioned and ideas unchallenged. If this is the case, what feels safe
for students might be antithetical to the discomfort that is sometimes necessary for true growth
and learning to occur.” Id. at 60.
269. Id. at 61.
270. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187 (1972) (holding the “mere expression”
of repugnant views is not sufficient to deny someone their free speech right); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) (“[I]n our system, undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression.”); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 869 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (discussing the
balance between speech which “exceeds all the proper bounds of moderation” and the “terrors
of the law were [it] brought to bear to prevent the discussion” (quoting COOLEY, supra note
173, at 429)).
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things.”271 Indeed, “[i]t might also be important to discuss the connection
between personal and intellectual growth and periodic discomfort or
challenge.”272 President Obama summarized this line of thinking thus:
[W]hen I went to college, suddenly there were some folks who didn’t
think at all like me. And if I had an opinion about something, they’d
look at me and say, well that’s stupid. And then they’d describe how
they saw the world. And they might have had a different sense of
politics, or they might have a different view about poverty, or they
might have a different perspective on race, and sometimes their views
would be infuriating to me. . . . Sometimes I realized, you know what,
maybe I’ve been too narrow-minded. Maybe I didn’t take this into
account. Maybe I should see this person’s perspective.273

Students are supposed to go to a college or university to broaden not
only their academic education, but their social education as well.274 Many
students who go away to college are leaving their homes, sometimes their
states, and in some cases even their countries, for the first time. The very
act of being on a college campus and attending classes exposes each
student to variety of backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives.275 It is
important to foster acceptance and understanding, not by shutting down
or silencing discourse because it may be uncomfortable, but by
encouraging people to share their experiences without fear of reprisal from
fellow students, faculty, or staff, merely because they speak about a topic
that caused them to think critically about something.276
CONCLUSION
Federal courts have ruled time and again that speech cannot be
restricted, prohibited, or punished based solely on its content.277 To do so
would start the country down a slippery slope towards tyranny, the very
likes of which the Constitution was designed to prevent.278 Indeed, the
271. Robert Boostrom, “Safe Spaces”: Reflections on an Educational Metaphor, 30 J.
CURRICULUM STUD. 397, 399 (1998).
272. Holley & Steiner, supra note 13, at 61 (alteration in original).
273. Rose, supra note 1.
274. See generally Glenn Geher, Why Go to College?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/darwins-subterranean-world/201801/why-gocollege [https://perma.cc/BN9R-QK9R] (discussing fourteen reasons why students should go to
college, including exposure to diverse ideas and people).
275. Id.
276. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
277. See supra Section I.A.
278. Emerson, supra note 3, at 742 (“When men govern themselves, it is they—and no
one else—who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger.” (quoting A.
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960))).
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courts have also acknowledged that the freedom to speak and discuss
openly all things important to the current times is most crucial in the arena
of education.279 After all, an informed citizenry cannot be adequately
informed if discussion and debate is restricted.
And yet, that is what safe spaces seek to do. They seek to allow only
speech deemed “acceptable”—that is, speech that does not upset the
delicate sensibilities of the arbitrary few who control, among other things,
campus advertisements and guest speakers.280 To allow this manner of
speech regulation would be to permit—even support—some viewpoints
more strongly than others, to say the college fully supports and accepts X
platform, viewpoint, or opinion, but denounces Y platform, viewpoint, or
opinion. This is the very evil the First Amendment was designed to
prohibit.
Furthermore, to conduct such blatantly arbitrary control over free
speech on campuses would be not only detrimental, but antithetical to the
very reason students go to colleges and universities in the first place. One
could hardly agree that students could successfully broaden their minds if
their minds are only exposed to that which the administration approves by
way of “authoritative selection.”281 The mere act of attending college will
expose students to uncomfortable—even offensive—thoughts, beliefs,
perspectives, and opinions. And that is a good thing, because being
exposed to something different, something they do not agree with, forces
students to move past “I disagree” and explain why. If they cannot explain
why they disagree with someone, students cannot convince others that
their thoughts, beliefs, perspectives, or opinions are incorrect. In the
words of Justice Black: “I do not believe that it can be too often repeated
that the freedom[ ] of speech . . . guaranteed by the First Amendment must
be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to
the ideas we cherish.”282

279. See supra Section I.B.
280. See Complaint, supra note 226, at ¶ 11.
281. Id.
282. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting).

